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COMMENTS

Unsuccessful Employee Arbitrants Bring
Wrongful Discharge Claims in State Court:
The Accommodation of Public and Private

Adjudication
I.

INTRODUCTION

C ourts in several states' have recently
narrowed the long-stand2

ing employment-at-will doctrine by recognizing claims for
wrongful discharge.8 Wrongful discharge actions are based in con1. As of this writing, all but nine states have abandoned the strict employment-at-will
doctrine by recognizing some form of exception to it. The states that continue to follow
the traditional doctrine are Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. See Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 6, cols. 2-3; see generally
H. PERRiTr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACrICE (1985) (summarizing recent case law in
all fifty states).
2. "Employment-at-will" is an expression of a legal aspect of an employment relationship which affords an employee a "right" to quit his employment at any time, and his
employer a "right" to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason,
or no reason. Even today, this is the legal status of the vast majority of the workforce.
Recent estimates put at-will employees at 60 to 65 percent of the workforce. Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith,93
HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1816 n.2 (1980); see also Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (increased government scrutiny of employment-at-will needed as employers become larger
and more powerful and as the realm of effective labor unionism contracts).
3. The term "actions in wrongful discharge," as used in this Comment, refers to legal
actions arising out of the common law (actions sounding in tort or contract), public policy,
or statutory law (e.g., workers' compensation statutes authorizing an employee to maintain
an action for employer retaliation against an employee filing a workmens' compensation
claim). To rely on public policy as grounds to challenge a discharge as wrongful, a plaintiff
must prove that his dismissal would, if permitted to stand, damage in some way important
social interests. A common application of the "public policy tort" is in cases where an employee is discharged or disciplined for refusing to do something illegal at the employer's
request. See, e.g., Sabine Pilots Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (employee
dismissed for refusing to dump effluents into a river in violation of federal law).
For an example of a workers' compensation statute that protects employees from retaliation for filing a claim, see N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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tract, tort, public policy, or state statutes, and provide various
remedies4 for discharged employees. The advent of these actions
raises the issue of whether organized employees' will have access
to state courts to press their claims. The judicial response to this
issue will further delineate the boundaries between the courts and
arbitration in their respective roles as adjudicatory mechanisms in
the labor relations context.
In the last two decades, legislatures and courts have taken an
increasingly active role in reallocating rights in the employment
relationship.' For organized employees, this legislative and judicial
activism has created a patchwork of rights and remedies arising
from collective bargaining agreements, statutes, and common law.
Recent decisions permitting state claims for wrongful discharge
within the collective bargaining context 7 continue the trend toward recognizing individual causes of action in the employment
relationship.8 This trend has the potential to erode an important
element of arbitration-finality. Moreover, the long-recognized
advantages of arbitration as a method of industrial conflict resolution-informality, inexpensiveness, and expeditiousness-are
jeopardized as arbitrators grapple with complex issues involving
matters of public and private law.8 Although the use of arbitration
4. Remedies may be awarded in either tort or contract. Compensable in tort have
been: pain, anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of consortium. Punitive damages
are also available in tort. Tort-based awards have been found especially appropriate in
cases involving the wrongful discharge of white-collar employees, who, "unlike their brothers in blue collars, are psychologically unprepared for the loss of security and status following on unemployment." Blades, supra note 2, at 1413.
Contract remedies exclude tort-based remedies, and are generally calculated in an
amount equal to the wages or salary lost because of the employer's wrongful conduct, less
any income earned in substituted employment. Damages may also include the cost of securing substitute employment. See id. at 1413-16. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 comment b, comment c, illustration 8 (1981) (duty to mitigate damages in a
breach-of-labor-contract situation).
5. The term "organized employee" will be used throughout this Comment to refer to
employees represented by a union and subject to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.
6. See infra note 43. Courts have interpreted this legislation and fashioned appropriate
legal rights. See infra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 111-42 and accompanying text.
8. This Comment observes that over the last two decades judicial decisions regarding
arbitration have demonstrated a trend toward recognizing individual employment rights
that exist within the collectivist context of labor-management relations. See infra note 149
and accompanying text.
9. The distinction between public and private law is not clear in any context, including
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is on the rise, 10 the courts' treatment of wrongful discharge cases
adds a new dimension to the debate over the appropriate accommodation of arbitration and the courts.
This Comment asserts that the public function of promoting
industrial peace is best served through collective bargaining. The
courts are not adept at resolving workplace tension and should
strive to support private dispute resolution. To support collective
bargaining and arbitration, federal courts should severely limit
the nature of state claims that are not preempted by federal law.
Such a result would support collective bargaining by encouraging
finality in arbitration and mitigate the unsettled expectations
which arise when multiple adjudicatory forums exist.
This Comment arrives at the above conclusions by examining
court cases of the last two decades involving arbitration. It focuses
on the emphasis the courts place on arbitration's role. Section II
briefly describes the judicial preference for arbitration expressed
in the Steelworkers trilogy."1 Section III examines subsequent decisions which have shaped arbitration. Section IV contains observations concerning how the increase in public law in the employment context has affected the arbitration process. Section V
highlights the recent cases involving wrongful discharge claims
made by organized employees. Section VI explores how courts
make initial determinations as to the source of employment rights
and how this determination narrows the scope of arbitration
provisions.

labor law. See Klare, The PubliclPrivateDistinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358
(1982). This Comment will endeavor to use the terms "public law" and "private law" to
distinguish between legal obligations arising from the consensual relations of non-public
parties (private law), and obligations which are imposed on such parties by government
(public law).
10. Both Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and American Arbitration Association figures indicate a dramatic increase in the use of arbitration over the last 20 years.
For a discussion of these figures, see Robins, The PresidentialAddress: Threats to Arbitration,
34 Pioc. NAT'L ACAD. oF ARB. 1 (1981).
11. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY: PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AT THE CORNERSTONE OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY

Modern grievance arbitration12 blossomed during World War
II as a private means of resolving disputes over the interpretation
or application of collective bargaining agreements. Earlier experiments with voluntary arbitration met with limited success, 3 and
1
compulsory arbitration was an anathema to union officials. 4
12. The term "arbitration" has meant different things throughout the years. In the
late 19th century, the term was used to mean resolving labor disputes without a strike-an
activity we would now call negotiation. See E. WIrE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION 3-4 (1952).
In the early 20th century, the meaning of the term evolved beyond the concept of
negotiation, and referred to the use of neutral third parties to resolve disputes. Id. at 10,
16-28. The concepts of compulsory arbitration (government compelling parties to submit
their disputes to neutrals) and voluntary arbitration (parties freely deciding whether to submit their disputes to neutrals) were articulated during this era, and each concept had its
adherents. For a discussion of the public debate surrounding the compulsory versus voluntary arbitration issue, see B. RAMIREZ, WHEN WORKERS FIGHT: THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1898-1916, at 160-74 (1978).
Today, arbitration is generally voluntary. Once the parties agree to arbitrate, however,
the law may be used to compel arbitration in a proper case. See infra notes 19-36 and
accompanying text.
Arbitration over terms to be included in a collective bargaining agreement is referred
to as "interest" arbitration. Interest arbitration is most common in the public sector. Arbitration of disputes arising over the interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement is referred to as "grievance" or "rights" arbitration. Grievance arbitration
is found in both the public and private sectors. The term "arbitration" as used in this
Comment refers to grievance arbitration only. For a general discussion of the arbitration
process, see R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965).
13. Labor and management in the newspaper and clothing industries used voluntary
arbitration as early as the beginning of the 20th century. Such procedures were usually
adopted after prolonged strikes in those industries. See generally E. WITrE, supra note 12.
What success was had was often a result of the respect the parties had for the arbitrators
(Louis Brandeis, later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, was an arbitrator in the
clothing industry), and the ability of unions and management to educate their constituencies on how to use the new process. This was no easy task, particularly in intensely competitive markets where management especially would be loathe to agree to any undertaking
that might put it at a competitive disadvantage (as where arbitrators ruled substantially in
favor of the workers). Most voluntary arbitration systems failed because of the inability to
compel its use or to enforce awards. See generally J. CARPENTER, COMPETITION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NEEDLE TRADES, 1910-1967 (1972).
14. Samuel Gompers came out strongly against compulsory arbitration in 1892 and
remained staunchly opposed to it throughout his lifetime. As Gompers stated,
After I opposed bills for compulsory arbitration and compulsory enforcement
of the terms of arbitration, I have frequently been asked what I would propose
as a substitute. My invariable reply was: "Strikes are due to the workers' conditions or an aspiration for a better life. There is nothing you can do by law to
prevent these normal movements and actions of the working people."
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Workers, unions, and management gradually accepted arbitration
during the war because the government provided incentives for its
use, and it provided an attractive alternative to the strikes which
threatened the production of war materials. The incentive to arbitrate came with the government's decision to provide unions with
attractive union security arrangements as the quid pro quo for nostrike clauses and agreements to arbitrate.15 Union security
clauses made dues collection much easier. Subsequently, union
treasuries became healthy, and unions were able to more effectively represent their members and organize new locals.16 Strong
unions were able to direct their members to achieve gains through
bargaining rather than strikes. Effective collective bargaining
eliminated the need for further government intervention in the
form of compulsory arbitration or industry takeover. The role arbitration played during the war was recognized, and it gained congressional and judicial support soon thereafter.
Shortly after World War II the Labor-Management Relations
Act was enacted.1 7 Congress explicitly assented to arbitration in
section 203(d) of the Act:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application of interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in
exceptional cases.

s

Congress favored arbitration over strikes or litigation as the
preferred method of industrial dispute-resolution. Problems with
the process arose, however, when parties to collective bargaining
agreements containing arbitration clauses chose not to arbitrate,
or chose to ignore an arbitrator's decision. It was at this point in
the voluntary arbitration process that a major weakness was exposed-arbitration awards were not enforceable in federal court.
S.

GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 155

(1984). See also id.

at 155-60 (discussing superiority of non-compulsory solutions to industrial disputes).
15. Lichtenstein, Ambiguous Legacy: The Union Security Problem During World War I1, 18
LAB. Hisr. 214 (1977).
16. Id. at 232.
17. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,19 the Supreme Court held
that section 30120 of the Act provided a remedy for a party seeking to compel either arbitration or compliance with an arbitrator's
award. 21 Thus, the Court established that section 301 was intended to be the "sanction behind agreements to arbitrate," 22 and
23
that federal law was to be fashioned to carry out this intent.
This is significant because a uniform system of federal law for enforcing arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements
would preclude the patchwork of variability inherent in a system
of state enforcement.
Thereafter, the body of federal law regarding arbitration was
crafted. In 1960, the Supreme Court handed down a series of
cases, since then known as the Steelworkers trilogy. 24 The trilogy is
the legal foundation upon which modern labor arbitration rests,
and it has taken on meaning beyond the literal interpretation the
Court ascribes to the nature and function of arbitration. These
cases place arbitration at the cornerstone of our national labor
policy as an essential instrument of industrial peace.
In the first reported trilogy case, United Steelworkers v. Ameri19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
20. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
21. In Lincoln Mills, a union filed several grievances concerning work loads and work
assignments. The employer denied these grievances, the union requested arbitration, and
the company refused. Subsequently, the union sought to compel arbitration through section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The issue before the Supreme Court-whether section
301 was ever intended to be used to compel arbitration or compliance with an arbitrator's
award-had received mixed treatment in the lower courts. See 353 U.S. at 450-51. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of the importance of the problem and the contrariety of views in the courts." Id. at 449.
The Court ruled in favor of the union noting that "[iut seems . . . clear to us that
Congress adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance
disputes . . . . We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under section 301(a)
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."
Id. at 456.
22. Id. at 456.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 11.
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can ManufacturingCo., 25 the Court established that arbitrators, not

the courts, should decide the arbitrability and the merits of a dispute. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made several assumptions regarding the nature and function of arbitration. The Court
implied that arbitrators have more sensitivity to the subtleties and
tensions in the industrial environment"6 and are better equipped
than judges to make decisions in this setting.2 ' The Court also indicated a keen respect for collective bargaining and arbitration as
stabilizing forces2 in relations between labor and capital, and key
elements in the quest for industrial peace.29
In the second reported case, United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co.,O the Court concluded that unless the parties
specifically exclude particular matters, the arbitrator is empowered to hear all disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement. Many of the same
sentiments expressed in American Manufacturingwere echoed. Spe25. 363 U.S. 564 (1960). This case involved a union that filed suit under section 301
to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of the employer's refusal to reinstate an employee who had suffered a partially disabling work-related injury. The District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee examined the merits of the case and granted the employer's motion for summary judgment; the court of appeals affirmed, 264 F.2d 624 (6th
Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court reversed, 363 U.S. 564 (1960), noting that
[t]here is no exception in the "no strike" clause and none therefore should be
read into the grievance clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other ...
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance
* , *The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely
those which the court will deem meritorious.
363 U.S. at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).
26. "The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which
those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware." Id. at 568.
27. "[T]he grievance may assume proportions of which judges are ignorant." Id. at
567.
28. "Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle for handling any
and all disputes that arise under the agreement." Id.
29. "[W]e think special heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to serve." Id.
30. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In this case a union filed suit under section 301 to compel
arbitration of a dispute arising when the employer contracted out work previously done by
employees who had been laid off. The lower courts agreed that the complaint should be
dismissed. 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958), affid, 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959). The
Supreme Court reversed, 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and established limits for judicial inquiry
into arbitral processes. "[T]he judicial inquiry under section 301 must be strictly confined
to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did
agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made . . . . Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 582-83.
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cial credence was given to the abilities of arbitrators. 31 Attributes
of the process, such as its informality, were stressed. 2 The Court
declared that arbitration is part of a new order, one that will re33
place the "older regime of industrial conflict.1
In the final trilogy case, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp.,8 ' the Court announced that an arbitrator's award is
legitimate "so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.

'3 5

Again, the Court upheld the authority of

arbitrators, and provided further guidance concerning the limited
nature of judicial review of arbitration decisions. In addition, the
Court explicitly supported the parties' intention that the award be
final.36
The trilogy set arbitration on firm ground as a private dispute-resolution mechanism; arbitration awards were enforceable
in court, and arbitrators were free to decide the arbitrability and
merits of grievances so long as remedies drew their essence from
the collective bargaining agreement. The Court's focus was on arbitration's function. The language in the opinions conveyed an
appreciation for the lessons of history, and the success arbitration
achieved in resolving one of our society's more complex
problems-a means of achieving industrial peace.
31. "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in her personal judgment to
bring to bear on considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment." Id. at 582.
32. See id. at 578.
33. 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
34. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In this case the union filed suit over the employer's refusal to
comply with an arbitration award directing the reinstatement of several employees with
partial back pay. The district court directed the employer to comply with the agreement.
See 168 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. W. Va. 1958), The court of appeals, however, would not order
enforcement of the award because the collective bargaining agreement had since expired.
See 269 F.2d 327, modifiing 168 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.W. Va. 1958). The Supreme Court
effectively affirmed the district court judgment, with a modification in the manner in which
back pay would be calculated, 363 U.S. 593 (1960), modifing 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959),
contending that, "[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be
undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards. . . . [The arbitrator]
may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 363 U.S. at 596-97.
35. 363 U.S. at 597.
36. "This plenary review by a court of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final." Id.
at 599.
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ADJUDICATION OF PUBLIC RIGHTS IN A PRIVATE FORUM

The character of the employee/employer relationship in the
United States before 1935 could best be described as private, and
took the form of either collective agreements,37 individual agreements"8 or employment-at-will.-3 In 1935, however, the National
Labor Relations Act 40 placed over this relationship a broad statu-

tory framework designed to encourage employee efforts to organize and engage in collective bargaining. Within this broad framework employers and unions were free to negotiate terms and
conditions of employment, including conditions under which employees could be discharged. Thus, other than a specific prohibition against discharging employees for engaging in union activities,'1 the Act did not by itself provide employees with protection
from arbitrary dismissal. Any such protection had to come from a
"just cause" provision 42 in the collective bargaining agreement.
Since 1935, other legislation affecting the employment relationship has been enacted.' 8 Courts have also interpreted legislation"
37. Collective bargaining agreements existed for many years before passage of the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-187 (1982). However, unions had no federally guaranteed right to engage in collective
bargaining.
38. The individual employment contract has existed in various forms for centuries.
For an example of a 17th century contract binding an apprentice to his master, see S.
McKEE, LABOR IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, 1664-1776, at 69 (1965). For examples and analysis
of 19th century labor contracts used in the manufacturing trade, see C. WARE, THE EARLY
NEW ENGLAND COTTON MANUFACTURE: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL BEGINNINGS 160-68 (1966).
39. See supra note 2.
40. In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), which gave employees the legal right to organize for purposes of collective bargaining. This was the first piece of federal legislation substantially affecting the employment
relationship to pass Supreme Court review.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
42. A majority of collective bargaining agreements have some form of termination for
cause provision. These sections limit the right of employers to discharge employees. Typically, employees subject to termination are given notice and a hearing. Employees may
subject their discharge to the grievance procedure and arbitration.
43. Federal legislation which has affected the employment relationship includes the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (calling for the elimination of substandard working conditions
found to endanger commerce by promoting unfair competition and labor disputes); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) (prohibiting
employers from excluding a person, on the grounds of race, color or national origin, from
participation in any activity receiving federal assistance); the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982) (recognizing that workplace injuries impose burdens on both employer and employee, and warrant government regulation); and
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and fashioned common law4 5 that has added to the public rights

employees have in the employment relationship. Nonetheless, in
comparison with other western democracies, there is still much
that is private within the sphere of the employment relationship. 46
The modern collective bargaining agreement often serves as
the "charter ' 47 of this essentially private relationship. Parties to a
collective bargaining agreement often agree to settle their disputes through a grievance procedure ending with arbitration. Yet,
if a situation occurs whereby an employee has "dual rights" (i.e,
private contractual rights and public rights), tensions may exist between arbitration and the courts. The manner in which this tension has been resolved has influenced the arbitration process, and
will continue to shape the role of arbitration amidst the everchanging legal framework of the employment relationship.
A.

LMRA Rights Asserted in Arbitration: The NLRB Position on
Deference

The most significant statutory influence in the employment
relationship is the LMRA.48 Section 7 guarantees the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively, 9 while section 8 establishes unfair labor practices when section 7 rights are abrogated. 5 The National Labor Relations Board, which was
commissioned to administer the act,51 has fashioned a policy with
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)
(recognizing the unequal bargaining position of workers with respect to their employers in
the establishment, maintenance and operation of pension programs).
44. Many of the cases discussed in this Comment are predicated on statutory
provisions.
45. Common law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have occasionally created not only rights for employees, but causes of action against employers enforceable by
those same employees. For example, an employee, otherwise employable-at-will, could not
be dismissed because she refused to publicly expose herself at a function unrelated to her
job duties. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985). See generally Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 1 (stating that most American jurisdictions
have abandoned the employment-at-will doctrine as a strict formulation).
46. A. KAMIN, WESTERN EUROPEAN LABOR 69-91 (1970).
47. The Supreme Court has noted that the collective bargaining agreement is "rightly
viewed as the charter instrument of a system of industrial self-government." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
49. Id. § 157.
50. Id. § 158 (a), (b), (c).
51. Id. § 153. The National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter "the Board" or "the
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regard to its treatment of cases involving statutory issues arising
under the LMRA.
Under the Spielberg doctrine, 52 the Board will defer to arbitration awards when: (1) the proceedings have been fair and regular; (2) all parties have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision; and (3) the decision is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.5" In 1963, the Board added a
fourth requirement to its deferral policy when it ruled that the
arbitrator must have clearly decided the statutory issue arising
under the Act.5 ' In 1971, in Collyer Insulated Wire,55 the Board
went a step further in its support of the arbitration process by
creating a rule requiring exhaustion of the arbitral process before
it would agree to conduct a hearing on an unfair labor practice
charge.5 6 In 1972, the Board made it clear that the "Collyer apNLRB"] was established in 1935 through the passage of the National Labor Relations Act,
ch. 372, § 3, 49 stat. 449, 451 (1982). In broad terms, the National Labor Relations Board
is empowered with establishing and effectuating national labor policy. This is accomplished
through the Board's primary functions in administering the NLRA, namely, conducting
representation elections and ruling on unfair labor practice charges. Board decisions are
reviewable in federal court at the appellate level. For a detailed description of the Board,
see generally F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIoNs BOARD
(1974). For an evaluation of the Board's administrative and rule making functions, see E.
MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB (3d ed. 1980).
52. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). The NLRB has a policy favoring deference to arbitration even in cases involving individual statutory rights. The fact
that the Board, responsible for administering the Taft-Hartley Act, maintains a vigorous
policy of deference to arbitration, while federal courts steadfastly decline to so defer, is an
enigma in federal labor policy. See generally Moses, Deferral to Arbitration in IndividualRights
Cases: A Re-Examination of Spielberg, 51 TENN. L. REV. 187 (1984) (discusses the incongruous
position of the courts and the NLRB with respect to the policy of deference).
In response to this conflict, some commentators have proposed a federal labor court to
provide a uniform approach to labor law. See, e.g., Morris, The Casefor Unitary Enforcement
of FederalLabor Law-Concerning a Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganizationof Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 499-506 (1972). Presumably, a unitary system of labor law
enforcement would provide for a uniform deferral policy and thus eradicate the present
confusion.
53. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
54. See Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 885 (1963) (reversing an arbitrator's decision that had failed to "touch" the basic statutory issue involved in the dispute-whether
an unfair labor practice existed).
55. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
56. Id. at 842. The NLRB countered arguments that its decision in Collyer "stripped"
the parties of their statutory rights, including a right to appeal to the Board, first by expressing its confidence in the efficacy of arbitration and grievance procedures, and then by
noting that "by our reservation ofjurisdiction, we guarantee that there will be no sacrifice
of statutory rights if the parties' own processes fail to function [lawfully]." Id. at 843 (emn-
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proach" applied even in cases involving an employee's exercise of
individual section 7 rights. 57 In Olin Corp.,58 the Board clarified its
approach to deference in cases involving individual statutory
rights, 9 and held that it would defer to an arbitrator's consideration of a statutory issue under the Act if: "(1) the contractual issue
is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the
arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice." 6 0
B.

Other Statutory Rights Asserted in Arbitration:The Courts' Position
on Deference

The federal courts have been called upon to decide what effect arbitral decisions have on individual claims made pursuant to
federal statutes. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196461 permits individual causes of action against employers who commit
acts of unlawful employment discrimination.6 2 Under the analysis
6 3 courts will not defer to arbitral
of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
phasis added).
57. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). The Board held that if an arbitration avoided a resolution of a dispute that would be "repugnant to the purposes and policies of the [Taft-Hartley Act]," the Board might refrain from decision pending exhaustion
of the private adjudicatory process. Id. at 531. "[A]bsention," noted the Board, "simply
cannot be equated with abdication." Id.
58. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
59. The right asserted was derived from section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1982). The employee claimed he was discharged for union activity. See
268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
60. 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. The Board noted that its approach was supported by precedent. See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
62. Id. § 2000e-6.
63. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Before Alexander federal courts were split on the issue of
whether an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement should have access to
an individual statutory claim based in discrimination. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 1970) (no, if the arbitration has been completed), af'd,
402 U.S. 689 (1971) with Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 312 (5th
Cir. 1970) (yes, arbitration determines contractual, not statutory, rights).
In Alexander, a black union member was discharged, allegedly for poor job performance
(generating too much scrap material). The union pursued the grievance to arbitration.
Before the arbitration proceeding the employee also filed a charge with the Colorado
Human Rights Commission (which was referred to the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) claiming a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). Subsequently, Alexander lost the arbitration, and the
federal commission found no grounds upon which to find a violation of the Act. 415 U.S.
at 38-43. The employee filed suit in district court. The district court dismissed the action,
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decisions when employees assert Title VII claims. The Court began its analysis of the case by examining the legislative intent of
the Civil Rights Act, explaining that "[t]he clear inference is that
Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination." 4 The Court implied that its position was consistent with
the standard of judicial review established in the Steelworkers trilogy by noting that an employee "instituting an action under Title
VII,. . . is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather,
he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration
process." 5 The Court further clarified the arbitrator's role as one
involving "questions of contractual rights, rather than public
laws." ' 66 Further, the Court implied that the parties were not free
to bargain over statutory rights because the collective bargaining
agreement cannot "constitute a binding waiver with respect to an
employee's rights under Title VII. ' 6 7 The Court concluded that
the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated
by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitraton clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of
action under Title VII. The federal court should consider the employee's
claim de novo. The arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate. 68

Alexander was decided fourteen years after the trilogy, and
was based on a statutory cause of action that did not exist when
the trilogy was decided.6 9 It was the first time the Supreme Court
ruled on a question involving tension between the judicial forum
for adjudicating statutory rights, and the arbitral forum for adju346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971), and held "that petitioner, having voluntarily elected to
pursue his grievance to arbitration under the non-discrimination clause of the collective

bargaining agreement, was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Title VII." 415 U.S. at 43. The court of appeals affirmed. 466

F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). The Supreme Court reversed, 415 U.S. 36

(1974), refusing to find that arbitration had a preclusive effect on a Title VII claim, or that

the courts should adopt a rule for deference to arbitral decisions. See id. at 54-59.
64. 415 U.S. at 48-49.
65. Id. at 54.
66. Id. at 53-54.
67. Id. at 51.
68. Id. at 59-60.
69. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted four years after the trilogy was decided.

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982)).
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dicating contractual rights. The Court's ruling treated this tension
as if it did not exist, and raised the question of whether the
Court's holding would be extended to other statutes which grant
individual rights in the employment relationship.
That question was answered seven years later when the Court
decided Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.70 The issue
before the Court was whether an employee could bring a statutory claim in the courts under the minimum wage provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act7 1 after having submitted essentially
the same claim to arbitration under the terms of the union's collective bargaining agreement.72 The Court, extending the rationale of Alexander, held "that petitioners' claim is not barred by the
prior submission of their grievances to the contractual dispute-resolution procedures. '1 3 In drawing this conclusion the Court noted
that "the FLSA rights petitioners seek to assert in this action are
independent of the collective-bargaining process.' 17 The Court
then turned to the issue of the tension between the forums for
adjudicating individual and collective rights. It encouraged the
resolution of disputes through arbitration, and guaranteed individual statutory rights as well, explaining that, although "courts
should defer to an arbitral decision where the employee's claim is
based on rights arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement,
different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers.17 5
This holding is significant not only because the Alexander
holding was extended, but also because the nature of the right at
stake can be distinguished from the "fundamental" 76 right at
70. 450 U.S. 728 (1981), remanded, 750 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2116 (1985).
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
72. 450 U.S. at 730.
73. Id. at 745.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 737.
76. Chief Justice Burger suggested an approach which would permit a judicial forum
for claims which otherwise could be pursued in arbitration when these claims involve "fundamental" rights. See id. at 749-52 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The doctrinal analysis of the
nature of a right could follow closely the Court's analysis of fundamental rights under the
equal protection clause. See Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting Fundamental and Not-So-Fundamantal "Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of Equal Protection, 1977 DUKE L.J. 143.
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stake in Alexander. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger recognized
the different nature of these rights, arguing
that [a] fundamental right [a workplace free from discrimination] is not and
should not be subject to waiver by a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated by a union. But there obviously is a vast difference between resolving
allegations of discrimination under the7 7 Civil Rights Act and settling a relatively typical and simple wage dispute.

Barrentine spurred at least one commentator to predict that nearly
of a
any individual statutory claim could be litigated independent
78
grievance arising out of a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court recently confirmed the prediction that the Alexander holding would be extended to other statutory causes of action
when it decided McDonald v. City of West Branch." McDonald involved a police officer who arbitrated his discharge from employment. 80 He lost the arbitration and then filed a claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,81 alleging that he was
discharged for exercising his first amendment rights 2 of freedom
of speech, freedom of association, and freedom to petition the
government for redress of grievances. 83 The Court allowed McDonald to pursue his section 1983 claim, holding that "a federal
court should not afford res judicata or collateral estoppel to effect
"84
an award in an arbitration ....
quoted
from its Alexander and Barrenfrequently
The Court
tine decisions and reached the predictable conclusion that "an arbitration proceeding cannot provide an adequate substitute for a
judicial trial. Consequently, according preclusive effect to arbitration awards in section 1983 actions would severely undermine the
protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to provide." '8 5 This result is predictable because, to the degree that the
nature of the right is at issue, constitutional rights under the first
amendment are more closely related to the "fundamental"
77. 450 U.S. at 749.
78. Hoellering, Finality in Arbitration: How Final?, 34 PROC N.Y.U.
123 (1982).
79. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
80. Id. at 286.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
82. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
83. Id.
84. 466 U.S. at 292.
85. Id.

CONF. ON LAB.

97,
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rights86 at stake in Alexander, than to the "typical and simple" dispute in Barrentine. Even though the Court rejected the argument
that arbitration precluded the statutory claim, the Court reaffirmed its Alexander and Barrentine conclusion that the arbitrator's
87
findings could be considered as evidence in a de novo trial.
Two recent Ninth Circuit cases, Criswell v. Western Airlines,
8
Inc. 8 and Amaro v. Continental Can Co.,89 demonstrate the lower
federal courts' willingness to follow the Supreme Court's lead in
extending the Alexander holding to apply to other individual statutory rights within the employment context. In Criswell, the court
held that actions arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act90 can be brought independently from a claim arising
from the collective bargaining agreement.9 1 One of the issues
before the court of appeals in Criswell was whether the district
court failed to accord proper deference to the arbitral determination denying relief. The court noted that while the right to appear before the arbitration board was contractual, the individual
right asserted was derived from the ADEA.92 The court reviewed
the case in light of Alexander and Barrentine, and declared that
"the factors which initially prompted the Supreme Court to reject
deference to arbitration decisions in these instances [Alexander
and Barrentine] apply squarely to the facts in this situation.19 3 The
court noted that the district court did admit the arbitral findings
94
as evidence and accorded the findings the appropriate weight.
The court did not, however, suggest what would constitute an appropriate measure of weight to be given to arbitral findings.
86. See Yarbrough, supra note 76.
87. 466 U.S. at 292-93 n.13.
88. 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), affd, 105 S.Ct. 2743 (1985).
89.

724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).

90.

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).

91. 709 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1983), affid, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985). Plaintiff airline
pilots had been forced to retire because of age. They had sought instead to "bid down" to

second officer positions, and after being retired, submitted a claim arising out of the seniority provisions of their collective bargaining agreement. An arbitration panel, known as the

"System Board," denied relief. Subsequently, they filed an action in district court under
the Age Discrimination in Employment
did not defer to the System's Board's
Supp. 384, 392 n.14 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
Cir. 1983), as did the Supreme Court,
92. 709 F.2d at 548.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 548-49.

Act. In deciding for the plaintiffs, the district court
findings, but took its findings as evidence. 514 F.
The court of appeals affirmed, 709 F.2d 544 (9th
105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
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In Amaro, the court of appeals decided two issues regarding
the effect of arbitration on a statutory claim arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act:9 5 first, whether an arbitration award is res judicata of an ERISA claim arising out of the
same facts; and second, whether arbitration procedures must be
exhausted before bringing an ERISA claim. 96 In considering these
issues the court explained that while both the grievance and the
statutory claim arose from the same set of facts, they involved independent legal rights.97 Having concluded that different sets of
legal rights were involved, the court held that the doctrine of res
judicata could not apply. 8 On the issue of exhaustion of the grievance remedy, 9 the court could not distinguish this case from Alexander or Barrentine, and held that individuals bringing claims
under ERISA are "not required to exhaust grievance or arbitration proceedings prior to bringing an action under section 510 of
ERISA."' 0 0 The court also noted that ERISA rights, like rights
under Title VII and the FLSA, are non-waivable. 0 1
IV.

ARBITRATORS GRAPPLE WITH PUBLIC LAW

ISSUES

The evolution of our society is reflected in our legal system.
The threat industrial strife posed to our society in an earlier time
is indicated by the language of the Steelworkers trilogy. The decades that followed brought other concerns in the industrial relations context. In the 1960's, when the institution of collective bargaining was flourishing, attention turned to the problem of
employment discrimination. Legislation of the 1970's focused on
safety, pension rights and other individual worker concerns. In
the 1980's, state claims for wrongful discharge have emerged.
The courts have not abandoned the national policy favoring col95. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
96. 724 F.2d at 748. In this case employees filed a grievance alleging that they were
laid off because work had been shifted to another plant in violation of their collective bargaining agreement. Upon losing the arbitration, these employees filed an action under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982), alleging that
they were laid off to prevent them from accumulating the required number of years to
qualify for a pension. 724 F.2d at 748.
97. 724 F.2d at 748-49.
98. Id. at 749.
99. Id. at 750.
100. Id. at 752.
101. Id.
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lective bargaining, but the language of recent decisions reflects
current concerns, and is materially different from the language of
the era before the Civil Rights Act. Today's language reflects a
trend, or policy, of recognizing individual rights in the employment relationship and showing less deference to arbitration.
Despite the courts' increased recognition of individual rights,
and their reluctance to defer to arbitration, the arbitration process appears to be in a healthy state. The use of arbitration, and
10 2
consequently, the number of arbitrators, continues to increase.
The prophecy that permitting a later resort to a judicial forum
"would sound the death knell for arbitration" 1 3 has not come
true. Surprisingly, there is little research related to how arbitration has been influenced by the court decisions of the last two decades. To evaluate the impact of these cases on the arbitration
process, data should be collected to indicate what percentage of
arbitrations involve statutory or common law issues, and what percentage are challenged in court. These and other threshold questions need to be explored before insightful statements can be
made regarding the impact of these cases. It is undoubtedly true
that a significant majority of arbitration cases do not involve public law issues. Rather, the disputes are over the interpretation or
application of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the net
impact of the cases discussed above on arbitration may be minimal. However, these cases have heightened arbitrators' sensitivity
to public law issues. The potential for a residual effect on the arbitration process exists.
A residual impact from these cases occurs when arbitrators
alter their hearing procedures in attempts to accommodate reviewing courts, or courts which may consider their findings as evidence. The advantages of arbitration include its informality, and
the fact that it is less expensive and less time-consuming than litigation. The challenges presented by public law issues may lead arbitrators to invoke practices eliminating these advantages. It is
ironic that courts criticize arbitration as an inferior adjudicatory
mechanism,10 4 yet at the same time tempt arbitrators to give seri102. See supra note 10.
103. This phrase was used by the district court in denying the claim in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971), affid, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
104. 415 U.S. at 57 ("facts may. . . render arbitral processes comparatively inferior
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ous consideration to public law issues. As the Supreme Court
noted in Alexander, "[w]here an arbitral determination gives full
consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight." 10 5 In establishing the "such weight as
the court deems appropriate"10 6 standard, the Court encouraged
arbitrators to thoroughly consider statutory claims. If the arbitrator does so, in the hope that his or her findings will be given
"great weight," he or she must also pay heed to the courts' criticisms of the arbitration process by producing a more detailed record, swearing witnesses, and using stricter evidentiary standards.
In adapting, the arbitration process begins to lose its advantages
and becomes more costly, more time-consuming, and more formal. When this occurs, the residual effect of these cases is complete, and the real benefits of arbitration are lost. Arbitration
which resembles litigation in most respects is not an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism that would be attractive to parties
to a collective bargaining agreement.
Moreover, arbitrators receive contradictory signals from the
courts and the NLRB concerning the role of arbitration. In contrast to the courts, the Board's policy is clear: arbitrators must decide statutory issues arising under the Act. 0 7 Because the Board
has a well-developed deferral policy, the threat to the arbitration
process inherent in making it more formal is not as great in cases
that may arise under the LMRA. Thus, arbitrators are aware that
in order to decide a grievance they must decide the statutory issue
with an eye toward the Board's deferral policy. Arbitrators and
the parties know this ahead of time, therefore, the fact that an
arbitration may be less formal is understood by the parties. In this
scenario, the arbitration is expected to be a quasi-judicial forum,
subject to Board and court review.
The courts have not, however, clarified the role arbitrators
should take to deal with other statutory issues. On one hand, arbitrators are told they lack the competence and the authority to decide statutory issues.101 On the other hand, they are encouraged,
to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights").
105. Id. at 60 n.21.
106. Id. at 60.
107. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
108. 415 U.S. at 56 ("arbitration [is] a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of [Title VII] rights"); see generally id. at 56-58.
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as discussed above, to fully consider statutory issues so that their

findings can be accorded "great weight" as evidence. Since courts
have not provided any standards to measure the weight to be applied to an arbitrator's findings, no arbitrator can ever be sure
whether the attention he or she pays to a statutory issue will be

afforded any weight. The arbitrator who must decide whether to
consider a statutory issue ultimately makes a choice which affects
the conduct of the hearing-a choice that translates into time and
money for the parties. As suggested above, the parties do not
want a prolonged and expensive arbitration process.
Employers and unions have little control over how the arbitrator will treat a public law issue, yet there are steps they can
take to change the arbitration process. Appointing a permanent
arbitrator, could give the parties a voice in how they wish their
hearings to be conducted. 10 9 Other measures, such as expedited
arbitration, 110 will continue to be considered if the traditional arbitration process does not meet the needs of the parties.
V. ARBITRATION AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

A new development which may have a significant impact
upon the labor arbitration process is unfolding. State actions for
wrongful discharge11 1 are being pursued by organized employees,
despite the fact that the claim may have been previously submitted to an arbitrator under the grievance procedure of a collective
bargaining agreement. Federal courts have been called upon to
decide whether these state claims are preempted by federal labor
1 13
law.11 2 Recently, in Peabody Galion v. A.V. Dollar,
Garibaldi v.
109. Permanent arbitrators may usually be removed at the request of either party.
This fact encourages arbitrators to satisfy the parties, at least on the procedural level.
110. See Stessin, Expedited Arbitration: Less Grief Over Grievances, 55 HARv. Bus. REV.
128 (1977).
111. See supra note 3.
112. State claims in the labor relations context are subject to preemption by federal
law under the supremacy clause. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, see supra note 20 (text of section 301(a)), authorizes suits for violations of collective
bargaining agreements and is the federal law which preempts state claims. Typically, when
employees file state law-based actions against their employers, the employers seek to remove to federal court on the grounds that the claim is, in fact, based on a collective bargaining agreement. See generally Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468,
1472-73 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussion of removal theory). Removal is then granted by 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (any state action over which federal courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to federal court).
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Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,114 and Olguin v. InspirationConsolidatedCopper Co.,115 federal circuit courts have considered this issue, and
have decided that under certain circumstances state claims may be
brought by organized employees.
In Peabody Galion several employees claimed they were discharged because they filed worker's compensation claims. 116 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1)
whether an Oklahoma statute dealing with retaliatory discharge
for the filing of workers' compensation claims was preempted by
federal labor law; (2) whether the federal policy favoring arbitration precludes the application of the state statutes; and (3)
whether the action under the state statutes violated state law per1 17
taining to exclusivity of remedies.
The court held that the state statute was not preempted by
federal labor law.1 1 The court explained: "[W]e foresee no likelihood of frustration of national labor policies. . . . [T]his statute
would stand up under analysis and would fit within the 'state conThe reason employers do this is that the burden on the plaintiff is two-tiered under the
substituted federal law. The plaintiff must establish that the union breached its duty of fair
representation and that the employer breached the "just cause" provision of the agreement. See 740 F.2d at 1476. For an analysis of the effectiveness of these suits, see Goldberg,
The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do In Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89 (1985).
Traditional state interests have been recognized in the federal law of labor relations.
Such interests are sustained against federal preemption, for example, when they are
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S.
491, 498 (1983) (fraud and misrepresentation); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass); Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress). However,
"[i]n such cases, the state's interest . . . is balanced against [the interests of federal labor
law]." Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498-99. For an analysis of the current state of the federal preemption doctrine, see Comment, Strikebreakers, The Supreme Court, and Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale: The Continuing Erosion of Federal Labor Preemption, 33 BUFFALO L. REv. 839 (1984).
113. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
115. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
116. 666 F.2d at 1312. The dispute grew out of the fact that Peabody laid off 34
employees who previously filed workers' compensation claims and were found to be partially disabled. These layoffs amounted to discharges because the nature of the recall provisions in the agreement were such that suitable jobs were not available for these employees.
The employees filed grievances, two of which went to arbitration. Peabody won these arbi-

trations and three of the discharged employees filed suit pursuant to

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

85, §§ 5-7 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984-1985) which authorizes "retaliatory discharge" actions. 666 F.2d at 1312.
117. 666 F.2d at 1313.
118. Id. at 1323.
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cern' exceptions to the preemption requirement."" 9 On the issue
of whether federal law precludes the application of the state statute the court held that the arbitration provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement did not preclude the statutory action.2 0
The court noted that some aspects of the dispute were not subject
to arbitration, and indicated that "even if it were determined that
the dispute was arbitrable, neither the exclusivity rule nor exhaus1
tion concerns would deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.''

While recognizing that the individual right asserted arose under
state law rather than federal law, the court concluded
"that that
22
1
does not constitute a distinguishing factor."'

The court held that arbitration was not the exclusive remedy
under state law,'123 and explained that
the statute at issue in this case plainly was intended to prohibit all retaliatory
discharges related to workers' compensation claims, regardless of the existence of alternative remedies in collective bargaining agreements. The statute is not precluded here by federal policies; a fortiori, then, it is not pre24
cluded by any state exclusivity provisions.

This case was not appealed to the Supreme Court, however it established that in the Tenth Circuit, actions based on a state statute sounding in tort may be pursued regardless of whether an arbitration decision has been sought or rendered.
The Ninth Circuit considered similar issues in Garibaldi v.
Lucky Food Stores.' 25 Garibaldi was covered by a collective bargain-

ing agreement when he was discharged from employment. He
filed a grievance which was pursued to arbitration.'

2

He lost the

arbitration, and subsequently filed a complaint in state court alleging that he was discharged in violation of state public policy because he reported to the local health department that he was instructed by his employer to deliver spoiled milk.1 2 The court was
called upon to decide two issues: (1) whether a state action for
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
the "just
127.

Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1320.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1324.
726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1368. The basis for his grievance was that he was terminated in violation of
cause" provisions of the agreement. See id.
Id.
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wrongful discharge is preempted by the LMRA; and (2) whether
the state claim should be 12precluded
because the employee chose
8
to arbitrate his grievance.
The court held that the state claim was not preempted, reasoning that
a claim grounded in state law for wrongful termination for public policy reasons poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining process; ...

The

remedy is in tort, distinct from any contractual remedy an employee might
have under the collective bargaining contract. It furthers the state's interest

in protecting the general public-an interest that transcends the employment relationship. 12 9

In addition, the court held that the arbitration award did not preclude the state tort claim. 130 The court quoted from Alexander to
support its contention that the source of the right derived from
the state public policy exception to the at-will doctrine was inde1 31
pendent from the source of the right to arbitrate the dispute.
The court concluded:
We find the same considerations relevant here as in the preemption context-the state law may protect interests separate from those protected by
the NLRA provided the interests do not interfere with the collective bar-

gaining process. Since we find that the state
claim is not preempted, we do
13 2
not find the prior arbitration a barrier.

Olguin v. InspirationConsolidated Copper Co.133 is the most recent case involving an organized employee attempting to seek relief in state court for wrongful discharge. Olguin was discharged
for disciplinary infractions after seven years of employment.11 He
filed a grievance claiming that he was discharged in violation of
the "just cause" provisions of the collective bargaining agreement,
but the grievance was not taken to arbitration.13 5 After pursuing
administrative remedies,138 he brought suit in state court attempt128. Id. at 1369, 1375.
129. Id. at 1375.
130. Id. at 1376. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to

remand to the California state court. Id.
131. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
132. 726 F.2d at 1375-76.
133. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
134. The disciplinary actions were given for: (1) leaving the work area; (2) damaging a
welding torch; (3) poor work performance; and (4) misusing and damaging a saw without
reporting the damage. Olguin was discharged following the last incident. Id. at 1470 n.2.
135. Id.
136. This case demonstrated the array of remedies that can be sought. Olguin sought
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ing to fashion his complaint so as to resist removal to federal
137
court on preemption grounds.

The court used this opportunity to explain the Garibaldiholding, and dismissed Olguin's claim as arising "not under state law
but under federal labor law."' 138 The court acknowledged that not
"every dispute that can arise out of an employment relationship
[can be covered by federal law]," 139 and the "court must attempt
1 40
to weigh the state's interests against those of federal policy,"
but concluded that each of Olguin's state claims were preempted.1 41 The Garibaldiholding was distinguished on the ground

that the claim in that instance arose in connection with the state's
interest in protecting the health of its citizens, and no such state
interest was identified by Olguin. In language clearly supportive
of collective bargaining the court declared that "the agreement
provides the same or greater protection of job security that state
tort law seeks to provide for nonunionized
employees; accordingly
14 2
federal law preempts state law.

VI. THE "SOURCE OF THE RIGHT" ANALYSIS, THE SCOPE OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

Federal courts are employing a "source of the right" analysis

in potential dual rights cases.

43

Under this analysis, the initial in-

quiry is the source of the right claimed. If the source of the right
is a federal statute (other than the NLRA), the trend is that courts
will not defer to arbitration awards and will permit the individual
remedies under: (1) the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982); (3) the Taft-Hartley Act; and
(4) state law. 740 F.2d at 1471.
137. 740 F.2d at 1471. The complaint contained four causes of action under state law:
(1) wrongful discharge; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (4) breach of contract. The complaint was based solely
on state law. Id. at 1471, 1474-76. References to the collective bargaining agreement
(which would have placed the dispute within the context of federal labor law) were left out.
Id. at 1471.
138. See 740 F.2d at 1471. This fact was responsible for the employer's ability to remove Olguin's action from the Arizona Superior Court to federal district court under the
authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See supra note 112.
139. 740 F.2d at 1473.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1474.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 37-110 and accompanying text.
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to seek a remedy in federal court.1 44 If the source of the right is
the NLRA or the collective bargaining agreement, courts defer
to
1 45
the arbitration award subject to the Board's deferral policy. ,

If

the source of the right is state law, a threshold analysis is undertaken to determine whether the claim is preempted by federal labor law. 146 State claims that are preempted come within the
Board's jurisdiction and its deferral policy. Claims based on state
interests outside federal jurisdiction are remanded to state court.
Whether the result achieved under the source of the right analysis
is consistent with the national labor policy preferring arbitration
is subject to debate.
One view is that the policy preferring arbitration places all
employment disputes in the organized workplace within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 47 Supplanting arbitration with other adjudicatory forums is seen as weakening the process by calling into
doubt the authority of arbitrators and the finality of their decisions. Moreover, private dispute resolution is 1the
explicit prefer48
ence of the Labor-Management Relations Act.

An opposing view is that organized employees have other
rights that supplement those conferred by the collective bargaining agreement.1

49

No tension is perceived to exist between arbi-

tration and the courts because the supplemental rights are seen as
existing outside the scope of the collective bargaining context,
thus disputes arising from them naturally should be adjudicated in
the courts. Since no tension is recognized, no explanation is given
as to why the policy preferring arbitration is subordinated.
This controversy centers around the scope of the collective
bargaining agreement in the employment relationship. The flexi144. See, e.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
145. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
146. Peabody Galion v. A.V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food
Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
147. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
148. See supra text accompanying note 18.
149. See e.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985); Barrantine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
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ble construction often given to collective bargaining agreements
suggests that the agreement governs many issues not explicitly
enumerated. Still, questions persist regarding whether arbitration
may be used when the agreement and public law confer a similar
right. Moreover, if the collective agreement does not specifically
grant a right conferred by public law, it is questionable whether
arbitration may be used.
With much of this controversy still unsettled, courts are now
faced with the issue of the scope of the collective bargaining
agreement in relation to state wrongful discharge claims. The major problem with applying the source of the right analysis to
wrongful discharge claims is that it encourages interpreting the
scope of collective bargaining agreements too narrowly. It is relatively easy to view any public law right as separate and distinct
from collective bargaining rights, even though the collective bargaining right may have predated the public law one. Once a collective bargaining right is duplicated by the legislature or the
courts, it can be seen as a separate public right, thus shifting the
adjudication of that right from arbitration to the courts. If the
source of the right analysis continues to be employed as it was in
Garibaldi,the locus of dispute resolution will shift from private to
public as more overlapping rights occur.
Because private collective bargaining rights exist within the
broader context of public law, the courts' logic in applying the
source of right analysis merely reflects a choice. Courts could recognize that parties to collective bargaining agreements explicitly
or implicitly acknowledge public law. Thus, public law issues, especially wrongful discharge, could be adjudicated in the manner
agreed to by the parties5 00 Claims that may arise under "just
150. Employee job security is an issue that illustrates the typical dual rights situation.
Employees have long been protected from arbitrary discharge through "just cause" provision in collective bargaining agreements. When arbitrators are called upon to decide
whether employees have been discharged for just cause, they may take into account the
same factors which gave rise to statutes and common law protecting job security. For example, it is an established practice for arbitrators to recognize a health and safety defense to
termination for insubordination. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 71324 (4th ed. 1985). If, in a situation like Garibaldi,an employee claimed that he was discharged because he expressed his unwillingness to deliver spoiled milk, it is well within the
arbitrator's competence and discretion, based on the agreement to arbitrate and the traditions of the process, to recognize such a defense without explicit reliance on law or public
policy. Id. at 714-15. The just cause provision is broad enough to encompass most employer action concerning the termination of individual employees, whether or not the em-
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cause" or other contractual provisions should be preempted by
the LMRA as a matter of national policy and adjudicated within
an arbitral forum. Such a result would support collective bargaining and the policy preferring arbitration.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court once declared that "[t]he collective bar1 51
gaining agreement covers the whole employment relationship.
Despite this sweeping pronouncement, courts have found in several instances that individual employment rights have a unique
identity outside the collective bargaining relationship. The decisions discussed above extend the public interest in providing job
security, as well as intrude on a key function of unions-protection of job security through "just cause" provisions
in collective bargaining agreements.
This Comment does not suggest that the institution of collective bargaining has been hurt by these decisions. As suggested
above, the number of cases involving dual rights may be very
small. However, a concern that emerged originally in Alexander,
and is highlighted in Garibaldi, is the extent to which government
interests in protecting job security will supplant private mechanisms established for that purpose. Garibaldi intrudes too far into
the private collective bargaining relationship by permitting state
interests to override private mechanisms that adequately protect
job security. With an increasing number of states recognizing exceptions to employment-at-will, 15 and commentators encouraging
job security legislation, 153 the question of the government's adeptness at absorbing workplace tension emerges. The courts were notoriously poor administrators of labor relations in the past.15 ' It is
open to argument whether differences in the law, or an enlightened judiciary, would make current courts any better equipped to
absorb workplace tension.
Collective bargaining and arbitration have been invaluable
ployer action is prohibited by law.
151. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579
(1960).
152. See supra note 1.
153. See, e.g., Summers, IndividualProtection Against Unjust Dismissal:Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484, 519-31 (1976).
154. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
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tools in the promotion of industrial peace. Courts should encourage their use despite the current dearth of labor militancy
which spawned them. Federal courts should recognize the expansive scope of "just cause" provisions in collective bargaining
agreements when applying the source of right analysis to wrongful
discharge claims. Claims that can be pressed through grievance
and arbitration procedures should be preempted. This measure
would support collective bargaining and arbitration, and insulate
the courts from the point role in promoting industrial peace.
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